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1 Introduction
In many labor markets, firms compete with each other for workers along several dimensions. These
include salary, employee benefits, bonuses, health insurance coverage, and opportunities for career
advancement. In most cases, firms and workers bargain over these terms of employment during the
hiring process. But in some situations, firms pre-commit to the salary or compensation package to
be offered for a particular job opening. It is not unusual for a firm to set policies regarding benefits,
bonuses, health plans, or vacation time, rather than personalize the terms of employment for each
individual employee. The terms of employment may be inflexibile due to firm-wide policies, or
contractual arrangements, or because the salary for the position has been widely advertized. Or
perhaps a department within an organization must negotiate, in advance, with a board of directors
or a department manager, over the precise compensation package to be offered for the position.
Thus, there are interesting labor market environments in which firms cannot tailor the various
terms of employment to the particular worker who they hire.
In this article, we analyze the competitive behavior of firms in one such environment. We
consider a posted-salary labor market in which the firms possess private information about their
own preferences. The market consists of a set of firms, each with one available position, and a
set of workers, each searching for one position. Each firm in the market posts a fixed salary and
commits to pay the posted salary to whichever worker is eventually hired. Moreover, the firms’
preferences over the set of workers are private information, so that each firm faces uncertainty
about the level of demand (among their competitors) for their more preferred candidates.
The combination of private information with the firms’ commitments to posted salaries
creates a novel, albeit specific environment. In particular, when the firms are unable to renegotiate
with each candidate, the possibility of Pareto inefficient matchings emerges as a concern. For
example, if a firm makes a high salary offer that is rejected by their first preference, any subsequent
offer to a less preferred candidate must be made at the same high salary, which may preclude
otherwise profitable arrangements. Alternatively, if a firm makes a lower salary offer to their
second choice, then discovers that their first choice would have accepted a marginally higher salary
offer, they cannot renege and recontract even when it would be profitable to do so.
The timing of events for the environment studied in this article are as follows. Before firms
and workers are matched, the firms choose salaries privately and simultaneously. The matching
process is modeled using the firm-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, developed by Gale
& Shapley (1962). Thus, the process begins with each firm extending an offer at their posted
salary to at most one worker, and each worker then tentatively accepts at most one offer and rejects
all others. Any firm whose offer is rejected can then extend the same salary offer to another
worker, after which the workers again decide which (if any) offer to tentatively accept. The process
continues until no new offers are made, at which time all tentatively accepted offers are confirmed.
In addition, there are two important rules that apply to the matching process. First, firms cannot
revisit workers who have previously rejected their offer. Second, firms cannot retract an offer that
has been tentatively accepted.
A well-known result from the matching literature is that the firm-proposing deferred accep-
tance algorithm gives each firm a dominant strategy to make offers in a straightforward manner.
For the matching procedure described above, this means that firms have a dominant strategy to
make offers in order of preference, but only to workers who are acceptable to the firm at its chosen
posted salary. Furthermore, since all workers care only about salary, there is a unique stable match-
ing for any profile of firm preferences and salary offers. As a result, no worker has an incentive
to strategically reject an offer. Thus, without any incentives for strategic sequencing of offers (by
firms) or strategic rejection of offers (by workers), the focus in this article is on the strategic salary
decisions made by the firms in the presence of private information.
The article first analyzes a two-firm, two-worker model, in which the firms can be one
of four (preference) types. The first result proves that, in the two-firm, two-worker model, there
are no pure strategy equilibria. However, there does exist a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium
in mixed (distributional) strategies which are continuous with interval support. The second and
third results derive the characterization of this unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Proposition 2
establishes that the equilibrium exhibits a separation of types, in the sense that between two types
who have a common most preferred worker, one type mixes over salary offers that are everywhere
higher than the salaries chosen by the other type. The type that offers a lower equilibrium support
‘concedes defeat’ in the event that the other firm is the type offering higher salaries. Instead, those
firms concentrate on competing in the event that their competitor is of their own type. Similarly,
each firm of the type offering the higher salaries pays a premium just high enough to always
outbid the other type, then concentrates on competing against their own type by mixing over an
interval of salaries. In this respect, competition is localized to firms with ‘similar’ types. The
full characterization result is provided in Proposition 3, where we show that the relative marginal
value attached to the workers by different types determines which type makes the higher offers in
equilibrium.
In the second part of the article, we extend the analysis to larger markets by replicating the
two-firm, two-worker model. In the limit, when there are a continuum of firms and a continuum
of workers, there is no aggregate uncertainty about the realization of types. Thus, competition in
equilibrium is confined to the most popular worker class. The third main result is a characterization
of the equilibrium in the limit case. We then prove the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
in continuous distributional strategies with interval support for each finite replicated market. The
proof, which is by construction, establishes that the separation result obtained in Proposition 2 also
applies to types with a common most preferred worker class in finite replicated markets.
Finally, we provide numerical results to show that the finite market equilibrium strate-
gies converge to the corresponding continuum equilibrium strategies as the number of replications
approaches infinity. Thus, as the replicated markets get larger, the uncertainty over competitive
pressure disappears, and competitive behavior is only sustained for the most popular worker class.
1.1 Related Literature
A similar environment with posted salaries has been studied by Burdett and Mortensen (1998).
They consider a game where a continuum of firms choose permanent wage offers and a continuum
of workers search by sequentially sampling from the set of offers. Workers search both while
unemployed and while employed for a job with an acceptable, or higher wage, respectively. The
principal result in Burdett and Mortensen (1998) is that wage dispersion is a robust outcome when
workers must search for individual offers, provided that workers search while employed as well
as when unemployed. They characterize the unique equilibrium (steady state) distribution of wage
offers under different assumptions about firm and worker heterogeneity.
Our approach in this article differs in several important respects from the setup used in
Burdett and Mortensen (1998). First, workers are not identical in our model. Offers are posted and
then directed by firms to particular workers, rather than posted for workers to search for and accept
as they please. In particular, this allows for a firm to exclude workers who are not acceptable to
them at their posted salary. Second, we assume that firms have only unit demands. That is, each
firm wants to be matched with just one worker, rather than to build up a team of workers.
The most important implication of these differences is that, in our model, each worker
faces a potentially different distribution of offers. Firms have different ordinal preferences and may
control which workers are allowed to accept their offer. In terms of our results, we also find that the
equilibrium salary distributions offered by different firm types exhibit wage dispersion (both within
and among the types). However, the wage dispersion is driven by private information among the
firms and the competitive pressure among heterogeneous firms for heterogeneous workers. This
is distinct from the wage dispersion derived in Burdett and Mortensen (1998), which is driven in
part by the multi-unit demands of the firms, and in part by their heterogeneous productivities with
respect to a set of perfectly substitutable workers.
This article is also related to several others that study salary competition in two-sided mar-
kets, although almost all of them investigate markets with complete information. In particular,
Bulow and Levin (2006), Niederle (2007), and Kojima (2007) study the effects of a centralized
matching mechnism on salaries relative to the competitive equilibrium.1 Bulow and Levin (2006)
provide a theoretical result which suggests that worker salaries are compressed and depressed rel-
ative to the competitive equilibrium, by the centralized matching algorithm used in the National
Resident Matching Program (NRMP).
The first treatment of matching with salaries is Shapley and Shubik (1972), which modifies
Gale and Shapley (1962) to incorporate a transferrable utility good in which salaries can be paid.
The early literature on matching with transferable utility was further developed by Crawford and
Knoer (1981) and subsequently, by Kelso and Crawford (1982), who devised a salary adjustment
process which converges to a core allocation.2 More recently, Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) develop
a model of matching with contracts that incorporates the Kelso and Crawford (1982) model.3 They
show that if the preferences of the firms satisfy a gross substitutes condition and a law of aggregate
demand condition, then truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for workers in a worker-proposing
matching mechanism.
While matching with salaries has attracted considerable interest in recent years, the existing
literature omits a study of the environment in which firms’ preference orderings over workers are
private information. The study that comes closest to doing so is by Hoppe et al. (2009), who
introduce a model of assortative matching in which there is incomplete information on both sides
of the market. However, the incomplete information in their setting relates to attributes of potential
partners, rather than preference orderings of potential competitors. Both workers and firms can
send signals regarding their own attributes. However, once a worker has chosen a signal in their
model, every firm has the same ranking over workers, based on their signals. Likewise, once a firm
has chosen a signal, every worker has the same ranking over firms.
In contrast, the objective of this study is to understand the effects of private information
about the preference orderings of potential competitors on salary competition. The baseline model
is most similar to the Bulow and Levin (2006) setup. However, it extends their approach by al-
lowing firms to have different primitive preferences over workers. This assumption then allows for
firms’ preferences to be private information, which is the main innovation to the existing literature
on matching with salaries.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and the match-
ing process, then introduces the general two-firm, two-worker game with private information. In
Section 3, we prove that there are no pure strategy equilibria, then provide an example which
1Another paper that investigates the importance of various assumptions in the Bulow and Levin (2006) model is
Gonzalez-Diaz and Siegel (Forthcoming), who focus on a set of job features, including salaries, reputation, responsi-
bility, work hours, training, and quality of facilities, that may affect a hospital’s attractiveness to workers in a non-linear
manner.
2A core allocation in this context is a one-to-one matching along with a salary schedule, in which no firm and no
worker can negotiate a salary at which they would prefer each other over their current partners at their current salaries.
3Other related work includes Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Sela (2009), Crawford (2008),
demonstrates the main features of the equilibrium in distributional strategies. Section 3 also es-
tablishes the separation result, and provides the full characterization for the symmetric Bayesian
Nash equilibrium in continuous distributional strategies with interval support. In Section 4, the
model is extended to larger markets. We characterize the equilibria of the limit case in which there
are a continuum of firms and workers, then prove existence (and the separation result) for finite
replicated markets. Finally, Section 5 presents the numerical results, which show that the equilib-
rium strategies in finite replicated markets converge to the corresponding continuum equilibrium
strategies as the number of replications approaches infinity. Section 6 concludes.
2 A Two-Firm, Two-Worker Model
Suppose there are two firms f1, f2 ∈ F and two workers w1,w2 ∈W . Each firm has strict pref-
erences over the set {w1,w2, /0}, where /0 represents being unmatched. It is safe to ignore any
preference ranking in which remaining single is the most preferred option, since a firm with those
preferences will exit the market. Thus, there are four possible preference rankings for each firm.
Pa : w1 w2 /0 Pb : w1 /0 w2
Pc : w2 w1 /0 Pd : w2 /0 w1.
Assume that each preference ranking is represented by a pair of values, one for each worker, while
the value of remaining unmatched is 0. This assumption is somewhat restrictive, since it means
that two firms with same preference ranking also have the same values for the workers. In Section
6, I discuss ways to relax this assumption about the type space.
Refer to a firm with preferences Pk as a firm of type k. Then the set of firm types is described
asP f = {a,b,c,d} where, for example, a = (a1,a2) and a j is the value of worker j to type a for
each j = 1,2. In order to represent the preference rankings, the values of the different types must
satisfy the following conditions.
a1 > a2 > 0 b1 > 0 > b2
c2 > c1 > 0 d2 > 0 > d1.
Definition 1. A worker w is acceptable to firm f if f prefers w to remaining unmatched.
The second definition modifies the standard notion of an acceptable worker to account for
the preferences of the firms at a given salary level.
Definition 2. Given any salary, x f , chosen by firm f , a worker w is salary-acceptable to firm f if
f ’s value for worker w is greater than x f .
The values corresponding to each type are common knowledge, however, each firm knows
only its own type. The types are drawn independently according to a common prior distribution pi
overP f = {a,b,c,d}. Given the two disjoint sets of agents, define a matching as follows.
Definition 3. A matching is a function µ : F ∪W → F ∪W ∪{ /0} such that
(1) µ( f ) ∈W ∪{ /0} for all f ∈ F,
(2) µ(w) ∈ F ∪{ /0} for all w ∈W, and
(3) µ(µ(i)) = i for all i ∈ F ∪W with µ(i) 6= { /0}.
LetM denote the set of all matchings.
For any firm f with type k = (k1,k2), the utility derived from a matching µ ∈M is given
by
u fk (µ) =

k1 if µ( f ) = w1
k2 if µ( f ) = w2
0 if µ( f ) = { /0}
.
Before the matching is determined, the firms each choose a salary. Then the following steps deter-
mine the matching outcome.
Step 1. Each firm makes an offer to (at most) one worker;
Step 2. Each worker tentatively accepts at most one offer, and rejects all others;
Step 3. Any firm whose offer was rejected may make the same salary offer to the other worker
(who has not already rejected them);
Step 4. Each worker tentatively accepts at most one offer out of the one (if any) it tentatively holds,
and the new offers received at Step 3, and rejects all others.
Step 5. Since there can be no new offers after Step 4, the procedure terminates and all tentative
matches are confirmed.
In principle, both the firms and workers could adopt many different strategies. However, as the
following two remarks make clear, it is not necessary to consider anything more than the simplest
strategies.
Remark 1. For any set of chosen salaries, each firm has a dominant strategy to make offers in
order of preference to salary-acceptable workers only.
Once firms have chosen salaries, the matching procedure described by Steps 1 to 5 is equiv-
alent to the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm for a specific matching market in
which the firms’ “preferences” are their original preferences, restricted to their (respective) sets of
salary-acceptable workers, and workers’ preferences are given by ranking the firms according to
salary, from highest to lowest. It follows from Theorem 5 in Roth (1982), that firms have a domi-
nant strategy to make offers in order of preferences, but restricted to salary-acceptable workers.
Remark 2. For any profile of firm preferences and any set of chosen salaries, each worker has a
dominant strategy to reject all but the highest salary offered to them.
Recall that the firm-proposing DA mechanism is stable. That is, for any profile of reported
preferences, it produces a matching that is stable with respect to the reported preferences. Since
all the workers have the same preferences, there is a unique stable matching for each realization
of firm preferences and set of chosen salaries. By Theorem 4.16 in Roth and Sotomayor (1990),
every set of worker strategies that form a Nash equilibrium with the truthful strategies of the firms
produces a matching that is stable with respect to the true preferences. Then since each induced
market has a unique stable matching, and the matching mechanism is stable, there is no other Nash
equilibrium strategy that dominates truth-telling by the workers, for any realization of firm types
and posted salaries.
Since there are no incentives for strategic sequencing of offers by the firms, or for strategic
rejection by the workers, the rest of the paper focuses on the behavior of the firms when they
decide upon a salary. In fact, it is useful to describe the outcomes from the matching process by a
direct revelation outcome function g. Let g :P×R2+→M be an outcome function that maps the
preferences (types) of the two firms and the salaries chosen by the firms into the set of matchings.
Firms have a dominant strategy to announce their true preferences over salary-acceptable workers
and the workers simply reject all but the highest offer made to them.
3 Equilibria in the Two-Firm, Two-Worker Model
The game is formally defined by Γ =
(
F,W,P,R+,pi,g,{u fk} f ,k
)
, which consists of the sets of
firms F = { f1, f2}, and workers W = {w1,w2}, the firm type space P , the space of possible
salaries R+, and the type distribution pi . The outcome function g represents the matching process
described by Steps 1 - 5, and {u fk} f ,k are the utility functions for each firm and each firm type over
the set of matchings.
3.1 Pure Strategy Equilibria
A pure strategy for a firm f is a function s f :P f → R+ which selects a salary for each possible
firm type. Given a strategy s− f for the other firm, firm f ’s expected payoff from announcing a
salary x f when its type is k is given by
EU fk
(
x f ,s− f ,
)
= ∑
p∈P− f
pi(p) ·u fk
[
g
(
k, p,x f ,s− f (p)
)]
.
Proposition 1. As long as pi has full support, there is no pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium
to the game, Γ.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for the proof is that two firms of the same type, who are willing to accept their
second favorite worker, will ‘bid’ each other up to the marginal value for the preferred worker. But
then each has an incentive to give up on the preferred worker and maximize their payoff by hiring
the second worker at a salary of 0. Once one firm does this, the other again has an incentive to
offer slightly more than 0 for the preferred worker and the bidding war will begin again.
3.2 Distributional (Mixed) Strategy Equilibria
Formally, a distributional (or mixed) strategy for firm i is a function σi : P → ∆(R+) which
announces, for each preference type, a distribution over salaries in R+. For simplicity, refer to
the symmetric equilibrium (σ∗,σ∗) by the equilibrium strategy σ∗ = (G∗a,G∗b,G
∗
c ,G
∗
d) where G
∗
k
is the cumulative distribution announced by a firm whose type is k. I assume that strategies are
continuous distributions with interval support.4 Before turning to the results, it is useful to work
through a simple example for the two-firm, two-worker model.
Example 1. Suppose a=(2,1), b=(2,−1), c=(1,2), and d =(−1,2), while pi(a)= 12 , pi(b)= 18 ,
pi(c) = 14 , and pi(d) =
1
8 .
Notice that the marginal benefit to getting worker w1 is higher for type b than type a, and
the marginal benefit to getting worker w2 is higher for type d than type c. Given these parameters,
a natural conjecture is that type b firms will make higher offers than type a firms, and type d firms
will make higher offers than type c firms. Furthermore, given the distribution of types pi , worker
4There may be other types of symmetric equilibria, with non-interval support, or discontinuous strategies. In
addition, there may be asymmetric equilibria.
w1 is ex ante more popular (or believed to be more popular) than w2. As such, one might expect to
see higher salaries on average being offered to w1.
Indeed, for Example 1, there exists an equilibrium, which is described as follows:
G∗a(x) = 2x on the support
[
0,
1
2
]
G∗b(x) =
7x−3.5
2− x on the support
[
1
2
,
11
16
]
G∗c(x) = 4x on the support
[
0,
1
4
]
G∗d(x) =
7x−1.75
2− x on the support
[
1
4
,
15
32
]
.
This equilibrium exhibits several interesting features. First, there is no overlap between the
equilibrium supports of types with a common most preferred worker. Since the marginal value of
getting worker w1 is less for type a than for type b, firms of type b always announce higher salaries
than firms of type a. In other words, firms of type a are resigned to getting their second favorite
worker (w2) when the other firm is type b. Instead, a type a firm focuses just on competing against
another type a firm. On the other hand, a type b firm offers enough to ensure that it outbids any
type a firm, then focuses on competing against the chance that the other firm is a type b. This type
of‘separation result between types a and b is also exhibited by types c and d, and as will be shown
below, is a characteristic of any equilibrium in continuous distributional strategies with interval
support.
Second, equilibrium salaries are higher on average for firms of type a than type c and for
type b than type d, even though they have comparable values for their respective preferences. This
reflects the relative popularity of worker w1 over worker w2. This notion of popularity is manifested
in the differences in the probabilities of facing another firm with the same most preferred worker.
For types a and b, the probability of facing another type a or b is 58 , while for types c and d, the
probability of facing another type c or d is only 38 . As a result, the average salaries offered in
equilibrium are higher for type a than type c, and higher for type b than type d.
3.3 The Characterization
Consider the general two-firm, two-worker model. The salary strategies chosen by types that share
a common most preferred worker together determine the matching for firms of those two types.
On the other hand, salaries do not affect the matching output when the realized types do not have a
common most preferred worker. Thus, pairs of types with common most preferred workers can be
considered in isolation from one another. Without loss of generality, consider types a and b. The
following two lemmas allow us to characterize the supports for the equilibrium strategies.
Lemma 1. Between types with a common most preferred worker, the lowest salary offered in
equilibrium must be 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 2. In equilibrium, there are no gaps between the equilibrium supports for types with a
common most preferred worker.
Proof. See Appendix.
These two lemmas imply that equilibria must be consistent with one of four cases. In each
case, type a mixes over [xa,xa], and type b mixes over [xb,xb], where
Case 1. 0 = xa < xb ≤ xa < xb
Case 2. 0 = xb < xa ≤ xb < xa
Case 3. [xa,xa]⊂ [xb,xb], and xb = 0
Case 4. [xb,xb]⊂ [xa,xa], and xa = 0.
Proposition 2 generalizes and formalizes the separation result illustrated in Example 1, by
showing that there cannot be equilibria of the form described by Case 3 or Case 4.
Proposition 2 (The Separation Result). Equilibrium supports do not overlap for types with a com-
mon most preferred worker. In particular then, any equilibrium must be of the form in Case 1 with
xb = xa or Case 2 with xa = xb.
Proof. See Appendix.
The proof for Proposition 2 is based on demonstrating that indifference cannot be satisfied
simultaneously for both types on an interval with non-empty interior. As a result, the equilibrium
supports in Case 1 and Case 2 must meet at their boundaries. For Case 3 and Case 4, the same
argument implies that a support which is a subset of the other must be a single point. Since best
responses in pure strategies have already been ruled out, there must not exist an equilibrium in
which one support is nested in the other.
The next proposition characterizes all symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria in which strate-
gies are continuous with interval support. Moreover, it provides the set of conditions that deter-
mine, for each pair of types with a common most preferred worker, whether their equilibrium
supports are consistent with Case 1 or Case 2. The condition depends on the relative marginal
benefits of getting the types’ common most preferred worker, and on the probability that a firm is
the type that also finds the other worker acceptable.
Proposition 3 (The Characterization). Consider the two-firm, two-worker model.
(i) If b1 > pi(a)(a1−a2), then in equilibrium,
G∗a(x) =
x
pi(a)(a1−a2)
on the support
[
0, pi(a)(a1−a2)
]
G∗b(x) =
1−pi(b)
pi(b)(b1− x) [x−pi(a)(a1−a2)]
on the support
[
pi(a)(a1−a2), pi(b)b1+(1−pi(b))pi(a)(a1−a2)
]
,
regardless of G∗c ,G∗d . The analogous result holds for types c and d if d2 > pi(c)(c2− c1).
(ii) If b1 < pi(a)(a1−a2), then in equilibrium,
G∗b(x) =
x(pi(c)+pi(d))
pi(b)(b1− x)
on the support
[
0,
pi(b)b1
1−pi(a)
]
G∗a(x) =
(1−pi(a))x−pi(b)b1
pi(a)(1−pi(a))(a1−a2)
on the support
[
pi(b)b1
1−pi(a) ,
pi(b)b1
1−pi(a) +pi(a)(a1−a2)
]
.
The analogous result holds for types c and d if d2 < pi(c)(c2− c1).
Proof. See Appendix.
Part of the condition in Proposition 3 has a simple intuition. If type b gets a higher value
from worker w1 than the marginal value for type a from getting w1 instead of w2, then type b will be
willing to pay more than type a for w1. The role of pi(a) in the condition is less obvious. Keeping
the values fixed, if pi(a) is relatively low, a type a firm does not need to mix over a large interval
to compete against its own type. As a result, if type a firms offer salaries above those offered by
type b, there may be an incentive for type b firms to offer salaries higher than the type a firms in
order to ‘steal’ worker w1 in the event that the other firm is type a. Any such deviation by type b
firms would give type a firms an incentive to lower the support of their distributional strategies to
the lower bound of 0.
Proposition 3 also leads to two corollaries. First, all things being equal, the more likely a
firm is to face another firm of the same type, the stronger the competitive pressure and the higher
the average equilibrium salary offered by that type. Similarly, the more likely a firm is to face
another firm with the same most preferred worker, the stronger the competition and the higher
the average equilibrium salary offered by the two relevant types. Proofs for both corollaries are
provided in the appendix.
Corollary 1. The higher the probability a firm type has to compete against its own type, the higher
(on average) the equilibrium salary offered by that firm type.
Corollary 2. For any firm, the higher the probability that the other firm has the same most pre-
ferred worker, the higher the equilibrium salary (on average) offered by the firm.
4 Competition in Large Markets
This section extends the analysis of competitive behavior to larger markets. A general extension,
in which the number of distinct workers and therefore the number of firm types grows larger, poses
some problems. As the number of workers grows larger, the firm type space grows exponentially,
which greatly complicates the equilibrium analysis. Thus, to keep the analysis tractable, we repli-
cate the two-firm, two-worker market. This generates a market with 2n firms and 2n workers,
consisting of n identical class W1 workers and n identical class W2 workers. We characterize the
equilibria for the limit case in which there are a continuum of firms and a continuum of workers,
then prove existence, for finite replicated markets, of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in continuous
distributional strategies with interval supports. Moreover, both Proposition 2 and Proposition 3
generalize to replicated markets. Finally, we provide numerical results to show that as the number
of replications grows to infinity, the finite market equilibrium strategies converge to the corre-
sponding continuum equilibrium strategies.
4.1 Market Replication
Replication provides a convenient way to conduct a tractable analysis of competitive behavior
in large markets. We use, as a baseline, the two-firm, two-worker market, with F1 = { f1, f2} and
W = {w1,w2}. In an n-replicated market, there are 2n firms, Fn = { f1, ..., f2n}, along with n copies
of w1, W n1 = {w11,w21, ...,wn1}, and n copies of w2, W n2 = {w12, ...,wn2}. Since w j1 and wk1 are identical
copies of one another, we assume that all firms are indifferent between any two workers in W n1 .
Likewise, all firms are indifferent between any two workers in W n2 . As a result, firms’ preferences
(and from these, their types) are defined as strict orderings over the set {W1,W2, /0} where W1 and
W2 are two classes of perfectly substitutable workers.
As in section 2, firm types that prefer being unmatched over every worker are ignored.5
This leaves four possible firm types that are essentially the same as the types in the two-firm,
two-worker model, except that the preferences are over classes of workers W1 and W2.
Pa : W1 W2 /0 Pb : W1 /0 W2
Pc : W2 W1 /0 Pd : W2 /0 W1.
Assume that each preference ranking is represented by a pair of values - one for each worker
class, W1 and W2 - while the value of remaining unmatched is normalized to 0. So, for each type
k ∈ {a,b,c,d}, k = (k1,k2), where ki is the value of each worker w in the class Wi. For the values
to represent the corresponding preference rankings, they must satisfy
a1 > a2 > 0 b1 > 0 > b2
c2 > c1 > 0 d2 > 0 > d1.
Each firm knows only its own type, and the types are drawn independently according to the com-
mon prior distribution pi over {a,b,c,d}. That is, pi(k) is the probability that a given firm is a type
k firm, or equivalently, has preferences Pk.
4.2 Equilibria in the Continuum Case
Before analyzing the equilibria for a finite replicated market, consider the equilibrium behavior
in the limit, when there is a continuum of firms, and continuum of workers. Moreover, suppose
that the measure of workers in each class W1 and W2 is half the total measure of W . In this
environment, since there are infinitely many firms, the aggregate uncertainty about the realized
firm types disappears from the market. That is, pi(k) is the actual proportion, or the measure of
type k firms in the market. This is a convenient feature because it makes the equilibrium strategies
relatively straightforward functions of the distribution pi .
As for the two-firm, two-worker case, the equilibrium strategy for a given type k does not
depend on the strategies of the two types k′,k′′ that have a different most preferred worker class
than type k. Thus, as in section 2, when deriving equilibrium strategies, types a and b can be
5We may just as well assume that they don’t enter the market in the first place.
treated independently from types c and d. Without loss of generality, consider types a and b. The
analysis is symmetric for types c and d. Proposition 4 characterizes the equilibria for the limit case.
It is broken into two cases based on the relative marginal values of worker class W1 compared with
worker class W2, for types a and b.
Proposition 4. The following two cases, (1) and (2), characterize the equilibrium when there are
a continuum of firms and a continuum of workers, with two equally large worker classes.
(1) Suppose b1 ≥ a1−a2.
(i) If pi(a)+pi(b)≤ 12 , then x∗a = 0 and x∗b = 0.
(ii) If pi(a)> 12 , then x
∗
b = a1−a2 and
x∗a =
0 with probability pa(0) =
2(pi(a)+pi(b))−1
2pi(a)
a1−a2 with probability 1− pa(0)
.
(iii) If pi(b)> 12 , then x
∗
a = 0 and x
∗
b = b1.
(iv) If pi(a)≤ 12 , pi(b)≤ 12 , but pi(a)+pi(b)> 12 , then x∗b = a1−a2 and
x∗a =
0 with probability pa(0) =
2(pi(a)+pi(b))−1
2pi(a)
a1−a2 with probability 1− pa(0)
.
(2) Suppose b1 < a1−a2
(i) If pi(a)+pi(b)≤ 12 , then x∗a = 0 and x∗b = 0.
(ii) If pi(a)> 12 , then x
∗
b ∈ [0,b1] and
x∗a =
0 with probability qa(0) =
2pi(a)−1
2pi(a)
a1−a2 with probability 1−qa(0)
.
(iii) If pi(b)> 12 , then x
∗
a = b1 and x
∗
b = b1.
(iv) If pi(a)≤ 12 , pi(b)≤ 12 , but pi(a)+pi(b)> 12 , then x∗a = b1 and x∗b = b1.
The formal proof is omitted. Instead, the intuition can be explained with reference to
Figures 1a and 1b, which provide graphical illustrations of the two cases in Proposition 4. Each
figure plots pi(a) against pi(b) and divides the space of probability pairs (pi(b),pi(a)) into segments
for each subcase of the equilibrium characterization. In both Figure 1a and Figure 1b, the bottom
left triangle corresponds to the case in which there is an excess supply of class W1 workers, and
therefore no competition between types a and b. In this case, both types can choose a salary equal
Figure 1: Continuum Equilibria for Firm Types a and b in Cases (1) and (2) from Proposition 4
(a) Case (1): b1 ≥ a1−a2 (b) Case (2): b1 < a1−a2
to zero and be assured of matching with a worker from W1. Thus, x∗a = x∗b = 0 for both cases when
pi(a)+pi(b)≤ 12 .
Figure 1a merges the subcase in which pi(a) > 12 with the subcase in which pi(a) ≤ 12
and pi(b) ≤ 12 , but pi(a)+pi(b) > 12 , since in each, type a firms mix between 0 and a1− a2 with
probability pa(0) =
2[pi(a)+pi(b)]−1
2pi(a) , while type b firms choose a1− a2. In each of these subcases,
the competitive pressure among Finally, in the case when pi(b) > 12 , type b firms compete with
each other and push the salary up to their marginal value from a class W1 worker, while type a
firms know that they will not be matched with a class W1 worker and so choose a salary of 0.
In Figure 1b, we can likewise merge the subcase in which pi(b) > 12 with the subcase in
which pi(a) ≤ 12 and pi(b) ≤ 12 , but pi(a) + pi(b) > 12 , since in each subcase, both type a firms
and type b firms choose a salary of b1. When pi(a) > 12 , type a firms mix between 0 and a1− a2
with probability qa(0) =
2pi(a)−1
2pi(a) , while type b firms choose a salary in the interval [0,b1]. This is
because type a firms drive the salary for a class W1 worker up to a1−a2 > b1, so that type b firms
are never matched with anyone. Since some of the type a firms will miss out on a class W1 worker,
they mix between the salary a1−a2 and 0.
4.3 Finite Replicated Markets
As in both the two-firm, two-worker and the continuum cases, we prove existence of a unique
Bayesian Nash equilibrium in continuous distributional strategies on interval support, for given
parameters of the model. The full characterization must be solved for implicitly using the indiffer-
ence equations derived in the proof, which is given in the Appendix. Most importantly, we find that
the separation result obtained in Proposition 2 extends to the equilibrium for any finite replicated
market, with respect to firm types with a common most preferred worker class.
Proposition 5. Given any finite replicated market with 2n firms, n workers in class W1 and n
workers in class W2, there exists an equilibrium (G∗a(·),G∗b(·),G∗c(·),G∗d(·)) such that G∗k(·) is a
continuous distribution with interval support in the salary space, for all k = a,b,c,d. The equilib-
rium supports for types a and b satisfy
0 = xa < xa = xb < xb
or 0 = xb < xb = xa < xa.
The analogous result holds for the equilibrium supports of types c and d.
Proof. See Appendix.
5 Convergence of Finite Market Equilibria
This section shows numerically that the replicated market equilibrium strategies converge to the
corresponding continuum equilibrium as the number of replications goes to infinity. The conver-
gence is illustrated by simulating replicated markets for the market presented in Example 1. Recall
that a = (2,1), b = (2,−1), c = (1,2), and d = (−1,2), while pi(a) = 12 , pi(b) = 18 , pi(c) = 14 , and
pi(d) = 18 . The corresponding continuum equilibrium is as follows,
x∗a =
0 with probability 141 with probability 34
x∗b = 1, x
∗
c = 0, x
∗
d = 0.
The equilibrium distribution for a type a firm in an n-replicated market satisfies
xa = 0
xa = (a1−a2)
[n−1
∑
j=0
2n−1− j
∑
k=n+1− j
(2n−1)!pi(b) jpi(a)k[1−pi(b)−pi(a)]2n−1− j−k
j!k!(2n−1− j− k)!
]
Figure 2: Replicated Market Equilibria for Example 1. Type a firms’ equilibrium strategies for
n ∈ {2,3,6,10,20,60,100,200,250}.
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and for all x ∈ [xa,xa]
x = (a1−a2)
n−1
∑
j=0
2n−1− j
∑
k=n+1− j
[
(2n−1)!pi(b) jpi(a)k[1−pi(a)−pi(b)]2n−1− j−k
j!k!(2n−1− j− k)!
×
n− j−1
∑
t=0
(
k
t
)
G∗a(x)
k−t [1−G∗a(x)]t
]
.
The last equation can be solved, given any value of G∗a(x), for the corresponding value of x. Then
the pairs (x,G∗a(x)) that satisfy the indifference equations for a given value of n can be used to
trace out the equilibrium distribution for a type a firm in a market that has been replicated n times.
Figure 2 plots these pairs (x,G∗a(x)) with x on the horizontal axis and G∗a(x) on the vertical axis for
several different values of n.
For smaller sized markets, n ∈ {2,3,6,10,20}, increasing the market size shifts more den-
sity to higher salaries and expands the equilibrium support. However, after n grows large enough
(for example, by n = 60), the equilibrium support approaches its upper bound of 1 (the marginal
value for a class W1 worker, a1− a2). Then for any larger replicated markets, type a firms shift
greater weight towards salaries very close to the upper bound. In order to maintain indifference
over the support, they must also shift density to the very low salaries (close to 0), which leads to a
sequence of CDFs that approaches the continuum equilibrium as n approaches infinity.
The same procedure can be run for type b firms, and also for types c and d. For type b firms,
the corresponding equilibrium support has a lower bound equal to the upper bound of the support
for type a firms, by the separation result. The size of the support for a type b firm’s equilibrium
Figure 3: Replicated Market Equilibria for Example 1. Type b firms’ equilibrium strategies for
n ∈ {2,3,6,10,20,60,100,200,250}.
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strategy is decreasing with the size of the market, since the probability of having to compete with
n other type b firms goes to zero. Then, since the lower bound for sufficiently large n is equal to
1, the equilibrium strategies converge towards the continuum equilibrium strategy, which places
the entire mass on a salary equal to 1. Figure 3 shows the simulated calculations for equilibrium
strategies of a type b firm in different sized markets. Of particular interest is the observation that
by n = 6, there is already almost no competitive pressure for a type b firm to compete against
another type b firm. Even with so few replications, a type b firm realizes that the chances of there
being more than 5 other type b firms (among the other 11 firms) is almost zero. As a result, type
b firms choose a salary just high enough to ensure that they will be ranked higher by the workers
than any type a firms. Similarly, as the number of replications increases, for each type c and type
d firm, the probability that there are n−1 other type c or type d firms in the market goes to zero,
removing any competitive pressure in their pursuit of a w2 worker. Thus, the equilibrium strategies
converge to the continuum equilibrium strategies, where type c and type d firms choose a salary of
zero. Thus, as the market is replicated, competitive pressure is enhanced only for the most popular
worker class. However, even then, there is no pressure to compete for the firm type with a higher
relative marginal value for the popular workers.
6 Conclusion
In this article, we study the competitive behavior of firms in a unique labor market where firms
must commit to offer the same salary to any worker they wish to hire. The firms do not know the
preferences of other firms, and so face an uncertain level of competitive pressure. In equilibrium,
we find that competition is localized, in the sense that the different firm types mix over adjacent,
but non-overlapping salary intervals. The characteristics of competition are robust to the size of
the market, but as it grows, the uncertainty disappears until there is competition only for the most
popular class of workers.
The article presents several key results for both the two-firm, two-worker model, and for
larger, replicated markets. First, we show that, in the two-firm, two-worker case, there does not
exist a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. We then proceed to a characterization of the
unique equilibrium in distributional strategies with interval support. This characterization shows
that strategy supports for types with a common most preferred worker are adjacent, such that the
type with a higher relative marginal value for the preferred worker pays a premium to ensure it is
selected before any firm of the other type.
We extend the analysis to larger markets by replicating the baseline two-firm, two-worker
model. In the limit, when there are a continuum of firms and a continuum of workers, there is no
aggregate uncertainty about the realization of firm types. As a result, competition in equilibrium
is confined to the class of workers that are more popular, while the salaries of other workers fall
to zero. For finitely replicated markets, we prove the existence of distributional Bayesian Nash
equilibrium strategies that exhibit the same separation result obtained for the two-firm two-worker
case in the equilibrium supports, for types with a common most preferred worker class. Finally, we
report numerical results to show that, as the number of replications grow, the equilibrium strate-
gies in the finite replicated market approach the corresponding continuum equilibrium strategies.
That is, when markets become larger, aggregate uncertainty about the actual types of other firms
dissipates and reduces the level of competitive pressure on salaries.
A natural extension of this paper is to consider a more general n-firm, n-worker model.
In this article, large markets are generated by replicating the two-firm, two-worker model, which
controls the size of the type space and keeps the analysis tractable. A limitation of this approach
is that all workers in the same class are treated as identical from the perspective of the firms.
Future work might focus on relaxing this assumption, while maintaining tractability. An alternative
approach may be to relax the restriction that firms with the same preference ordering must have the
same valuation or utility representation for that ordering. For instance, suppose each firm’s type
is a pair of values θ = (x,y), each drawn independently from some interval [θ ,θ ] according to a
given distribution.
Another potential extension is to introduce some correlation structure into the beliefs about
other firms’ types. Since in many cases, firms will be looking for candidates with similar character-
istics, it may be more realistic to relax the assumption that types are drawn independently from the
common prior. Such an extension will likely increase the degree of perceived competitive pressure
for the more common firm types, leading to higher equilibrium salaries. Finally, we might also
consider allowing for more firms than workers, so as to intensify the baseline level of competitive
pressure for all workers.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider any arbitrary pair of strategies (s1,s2) and suppose firm 1’s type
is a. Notice that, if firm 2’s type is either of c or d, then regardless of s1(a), firm 1 is matched
with worker w1. The case that matters is when firm 2’s type is a or b, because then the outcome
depends on the salaries announced by the firms. If firm 2 is playing s2, then firm 1’s best response
is to announce s1(a) = max{s2(a),s2(b)}+ ε as long as s1(a) ≤ a1− a2. If max{s2(a),s2(b)} ≥
a1−a2, then firm 1’s best response is to announce s1(a) = 0. However, given the choice of firm 1,
s1(a) = max{s2(a),s2(b)}+ ε , firm 2’s best response, if it is type a, is to offer s2(a) = s1(a)+ ε ,
up to s2(a) ≤ a1−a2. The same type of incremental best responses exist for type b firms, and by
symmetry, also for types c and d. Since the probability distribution over types has full support (i.e.
no type occurs with zero probability), every type faces some chance of being drawn into this cycle.
Thus, firms who have a common most preferred worker will continue to outbid each other
until the marginal benefit of ‘winning’ the worker is equal to the marginal benefit of not winning
(either 0 or the marginal benefit of the other worker). However, once that point is reached, the best
response is to announce a salary of 0, and the bidding-up process will begin all over again.
Proof of Lemma 1. Let [xa,xa] and [xb,xb] be the equilibrium supports for types a and b respec-
tively. Suppose by means of contradiction that neither xa nor xb is equal to 0. Consider 0< xa≤ xb.
Type a’s expected payoff from x = xa is
EUa(xa) = [pi(a)+pi(b)]a2+[pi(c)+pi(d)]a1− xa
and for any x ∈ [0,xa), type a’s expected payoff is
EUa(x) = [pi(a)+pi(b)]a2+[pi(c)+pi(d)]a1− x
< EUa(xa).
This means that [xa,xa] cannot be an equilibrium support unless xa = 0 or 0≤ xb < xa.
If 0 < xb ≤ xa, type b’s expected payoff from x = xb is
EUb(xb) = (b1− xb)[pi(c)+pi(d)].
That is, at the lower bound of type b’s equilibrium support, a firm of type b does not get matched to
a worker unless the other firm is type c or type d. But in those cases, the salary does not affect the
outcome, so that choosing a salary of xb > 0 is strictly dominated by x = 0. Thus, [xb,xb] cannot
be an equilibrium support unless xb = 0 or 0 ≤ xa < xb. Therefore, in equilibrium, we must have
either xa = 0 or xb = 0.
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose xa < xb. Then ∀x ∈ (xa,xb), type b’s expected payoff is
EUb(x) = (b1− x)(1−pi(b))
> (b1− xb)(1−pi(b)) = EUb(xb),
contradicting the inclusion of xb in the equilibrium support for type b. The proof is similar for the
case when xb < xa. Since the supports are intervals by assumption, there are no other cases to be
considered.
Proof of Proposition 2. Case 1: 0 = xa < xb ≤ xa < xb
Consider the interval [xb,xa], on which both firm types a and b make offers. Suppose by
means of contradiction that this interval has a nonempty interior. For type a, the expected payoff
for any salary in the interval is
EUa(x) = (a1−a2)
[
pi(a)G∗a(x)+pi(b)G
∗
b(x)
]
− (a1−a2)
[
pi(a)+pi(b)
]
+a1− x
for all x ∈ [xb,xa]. To make type a indifferent on the interval, we must have
g∗a(x) =
1
pi(a)(a1−a2) −
pi(b)
pi(a)
g∗b(x), ∀x ∈ [xb,xa]. (A.1)
Integrating equation (A.1) with respect to x yields
G∗a(x) = G
∗
a(xb)+
x− xb
pi(a)(a1−a2) −
pi(b)
pi(a)
G∗b(x), (A.2)
for all x ∈ [xb,xa].
On the other hand, type b has expected payoff
EUb(x) = (b1− x)
[
pi(a)G∗a(x)+pi(b)G
∗
b(x)+pi(c)+pi(d)
]
, ∀x ∈ [xb,xa].
For type b to be indifferent on the interval, we need
g∗b(x)−
G∗b(x)
b1− x =
pi(c)+pi(d)+pi(a)G∗a(x)
pi(b)(b1− x) −
pi(a)
pi(b)
g∗a(x).
Solving this differential equation and using integration by parts, we find
G∗b(x) =
η(x)−η(xb)
pi(b)(b1− x) , ∀x ∈ [xb,xa], (A.3)
where η(s) = s(pi(c)+pi(d))−pi(a)G∗a(s)(b1−s). Then, by substituting equation (A.3) into equa-
tion (A.2) and simplifying, we must have
G∗a(xb) =
1
pi(a)
[
b1− x
a1−a2 −pi(c)−pi(d)
]
(A.4)
for every x ∈ [xb,xa]. Since pi(a)> 0 and a1 > a2, the right hand side of equation (A.4) is strictly
decreasing in x, which implies that the interior of the interval [xb,xa] must be empty. That is,
xb = xa.
Case 2: 0 = xb < xa ≤ xb < xa
Consider the interval [xa,xb], on which both type a and type b make offers. Suppose again
by contradiction that this interval has a nonempty interior. For type b, the expected payoff for any
salary in the interval is
(b1− x)
[
pi(a)G∗a(x)+pi(b)G
∗
b(x)+pi(c)+pi(d)
]
.
To make type b indifferent on the interval, we must have
g∗b(x)−
G∗b(x)
b1− x =
pi(c)+pi(d)+pi(a)G∗a(x)
pi(b)(b1− x) −
pi(a)
pi(b)
g∗a(x). (A.5)
Solving the differential equation (A.5) and using integration by parts to simplify the solution, we
have
G∗b(x) =
(x− xa)(pi(c)+pi(d))
pi(b)(b1− x) −
pi(a)
pi(b)
G∗a(x)+
k
b1− x , ∀x ∈ [xa,xb], (A.6)
where k is some constant of integration. Using the fact that G∗b(xb) = 1, we can solve for
k = b1− xb+ pi(a)pi(b)G
∗
a(xb)(b1− xb)−
pi(c)+pi(d)
pi(b)
(xb− xa). (A.7)
Substituting (A.7) into (A.6) and simplifying gives
G∗b(x) =
b1− xb
pi(b)(b1− x)
[
pi(b)+pi(a)G∗a(xb)
]
− pi(a)
pi(b)
G∗a(x)−
pi(c)+pi(d)
pi(b)(b1− x)(xb− x). (A.8)
For type a, the expected payoff for any salary in the interval is
EUa(x) = (a1−a2)
[
pi(a)G∗a(x)+pi(b)G
∗
b(x)
]
− (a1−a2)
[
pi(a)+pi(b)
]
+a1− x,
for all x ∈ [xa,xb]. Solving to make type a indifferent and using the fact that G∗a(xa) = 0 by as-
sumption, we have
G∗a(x) =
x− xa
pi(a)(a1−a2) −
pi(b)
pi(a)
[
G∗b(x)−G∗b(xa)
]
. (A.9)
Substituting equation (A.8) into equation (A.9) and simplifying yields
x− xa
a1−a2 +
[pi(c)+pi(d)](xb− x)
b1− x −
b1− xb
b1− x (pi(b)+pi(a)G
∗
a(xb) (A.10)
=
[pi(c)+pi(d)](xb− xa)
b1− xa
− b1− xb
b1− xa
(pi(b)+pi(a)G∗a(xb)) (A.11)
for all x ∈ [xa,xb]. Notice that the right hand side of equation (A.10) is constant. To maintain
equality, the derivative of the left hand side with respect to x must be 0 for every x ∈ [xa,xb].
However, this derivative,
1
a1−a2 −
b1− xb
(b1− x)2 (pi(c)+pi(d)−pi(b)−pi(a)G
∗
a(xb)), (A.12)
changes with x unless b1− xb = 0 or pi(c)+ pi(d) = pi(a)G∗a(xb)+ pi(b). Furthermore, in those
cases, the equation (A.12) equals 1a1−a2 > 0 since a1 > a2. It follows then that the interior of
[xa,xb] must be empty; that is, xa = xb.
Case 3: 0 = xb ≤ xa < xa ≤ xb
Consider the interval [xa,xa], on which both types make offers. As above, we can solve for
G∗b(x) =
pi(c)+pi(d)
pi(b)(b1− x)(x− xa)−
pi(a)
pi(b)
G∗a(x), (A.13)
for all x ∈ [xa,xa], and
G∗a(x) =
x− xa
pi(a)(a1−a2) −
pi(b)
pi(a)
[
G∗b(x)−G∗b(xa)
]
, (A.14)
for all x ∈ [xa,xa]. In order to satisfy both equation (A.13) and equation (A.14), we substitute the
latter into the former and simplify, to obtain
G∗b(xa) =
[
pi(c)+pi(d)
pi(b)(b1− x) −
1
b1(a1−a2)
]
(x− xa). (A.15)
The left hand side of equation (A.15) is a constant. To maintain the equality, we must have the
derivative of the right hand side equal to 0 for every x ∈ [xa,xa], which means[
pi(c)+pi(d)
pi(b)(b1− x) −
1
b1(a1−a2)
]
=
pi(c)+pi(d)
pi(b)(b1− x)2 (x− xa) (A.16)
However, equation (A.16) has a unique solution, which implies that xa = xa. Since we have al-
ready ruled out pure strategies as best responses, it follows that there are no equilibria of the form
described by Case 3.
Case 4: 0 = xa ≤ xb < xb ≤ xa
The steps to prove that Case 4 cannot occur are analogous to the steps for Case 3. We
conclude that in order to simultaneously satisfy the conditions for indifference by both types on
the interval [xb,xb], we must have xb = xb, which we know cannot be true, since we have already
ruled out pure strategies. Thus, there are no equilibria of the form described by Case 4.
Proof of Proposition 3. By Proposition 2, in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the supports for the
strategies of two types with a common most preferred worker (say, a and b) must satisfy either
Case 1 with xa = xb, or Case 2 with xb = xa.
Case 1:
Consider Case 1 and suppose that G∗a(·) and G∗b(·) are the candidate equilibrium strategies
for types a and b. For each salary x in the interval [0,xa], type a firms have an expected payoff
equal to
EUa(x) = a1pi(a)G∗a(x)+a2pi(a)(1−G∗a(x))+a2pi(b)]+a1[pi(c)+pi(d)]− x.
Since the firm needs to be indifferent between any salary that is offered as part of its equilibrium
strategy, we must have
g∗a(x) =
1
pi(a)(a1−a2) ∀x ∈ (0,xa]. (A.17)
Integrating with respect to x yields
G∗a(x) = G
∗
a(0)+
x∫
0
1
pi(a)(a1−a2)ds (A.18)
= G∗a(0)+
x
pi(a)(a1−a2) , (A.19)
for all x ∈ [0,xa]. We assume that when both firms choose a salary of 0, the workers flip a coin if
they have to decide between the two offers. As a result, the payoff from x = 0 is strictly less than
from some small ε > 0. Thus, G∗a(0) = 0. Then we have
G∗a(x) =
x
pi(a)(a1−a2) ∀x ∈ [0,xa], (A.20)
and since G∗a(xa) = 1, we can solve for xa = pi(a)(a1−a2).
Similarly, for each salary x in the interval [xa,xb], type b firms have an expected payoff
equal to
EUb(x) = (b1− x)[pi(b)G∗b(x)+1−pi(b)].. (A.21)
In order for type b firms to be indifferent between all the salaries in the interval [xa,xb], we must
have
g∗b(x)−
G∗b(x)
b1− x =
1−pi(b)
pi(b)(b1− x) , ∀x ∈ (xa,xb] (A.22)
Solving the differential equation in A.22 gives
G∗b(x) =
1−pi(b)
pi(b)(b1− x)(x− xa)+
c
b1− x , ∀x ∈ [xa,xb]. (A.23)
G∗b(xb) = 1 allows us to solve for
c = b1− xb− 1−pi(b)pi(b) (xb− xa),
and substitue into equation A.23, which simplifies then to
G∗b(x) = 1−
xb− x
pi(b)(b1− x) , ∀x ∈ [xa,xb]. (A.24)
Having solved for xa = pi(a)(a1−a2), we use the fact that G∗b(xa) = 0 to solve for
xb = pi(b)b1+(1−pi(b))pi(a)(a1−a2). (A.25)
Substituting equation A.25 into equation A.24 and simplifying gives the equilibrium strategy for
type b firms,
G∗b(x) =
1−pi(b)
pi(b)(b1− x) [x−pi(a)(a1−a2)]
on the support
[
pi(a)(a1−a2), pi(b)b1+(1−pi(b))pi(a)(a1−a2)
]
The condition that b1 > pi(a)(a1− a2) follows immediately, since if b1 < pi(a)(a1− a2), then[
pi(a)(a1−a2), pi(b)b1+(1−pi(b))pi(a)(a1−a2)
]
is not an interval; the upper bound is less than
the lower bound. This takes care of Case 1.
Case 2:
Now consider Case 2. For each salary x in the interval [0,xb], type b firms have an expected
payoff equal to
EUb(x) = (b1− x)[pi(b)G∗b(x)+pi(c)+pi(d)]. (A.26)
In order for type b firms to be indifferent between all the salaries in the interval [0,xb], we must
have
g∗b(x)−
G∗b(x)
b1− x =
pi(c)+pi(d)
pi(b)(b1− x) , ∀x ∈ (0,xb]. (A.27)
Solving the differential equation in A.27 gives
G∗b(x) =
pi(c)+pi(d)
pi(b)(b1− x)x+
c
b1− x , ∀x ∈ (0,xb]. (A.28)
For the same reasons as above, we can easily verify that G∗b(0) = 0, which implies c = 0, and
therefore
G∗b(x) =
pi(c)+pi(d)
pi(b)(b1− x)x ∀x ∈ [0,xb]. (A.29)
Since G∗b(xb) = 1, we can solve for xb =
pi(b)b1
1−pi(a) .
For a type a firm, the expected payoff for each salary x ∈ [xb,xa] is given by
EUa(x) = a1pi(a)G∗a(x)+a2pi(a)(1−G∗a(x))+a1(1−pi(a))− x. (A.30)
For firm type a to be indifferent on the interval, we must have
g∗a(x) =
1
pi(a)(a1−a2) , ∀x ∈ [xb,xa]. (A.31)
Integrating and using the fact that G∗a(xb) = 0, we obtain
G∗a(x) =
x− xb
pi(a)(a1−a2) , (A.32)
for all x ∈ [xb,xa]. Then substituting xb = pi(b)b11−pi(a) into equation A.32 and simplifying gives the
equilibrium strategy for type a firms,
G∗a(x) =
(1−pi(a))x−pi(b)b1
pi(a)(1−pi(a))(a1−a2) (A.33)
on the support
[
pi(b)b1
1−pi(a) ,xa
]
. (A.34)
Finally, using G∗a(xa) = 1 allows us to solve for xa =
pi(b)b1
1−pi(a) +pi(a)(a1− a2). This takes care of
Case 2. The proof for types c and d is identical, except for the notation.
Proof of Corollary 1. In Case 1, the expected salary offer of firm type a is just the expected value
of a uniform random variable on
[
0,pi(a)(a1−a2)
]
- that is,
E(xa) =
pi(a)(a1−a2)
2
,
which is strictly increasing in pi(a). For type b, the expected salary is
E(xb) =
pi(b)b1+(1−pi(b))pi(a)(a1−a2)∫
pi(a)(a1−a2)
x ·g∗b(x)dx. (A.35)
Recall that the distribution
G∗b(x) =
1−pi(b)
pi(b)(b1− x) [x−pi(a)(a1−a2)] ,
which gives
g∗b(x) =
1−pi(b)
pi(b)
(
b1−pi(a)(a1−a2)
(b1− x)2
)
. (A.36)
Since b1 > pi(a)(a1−a2) for this case, we have b1 > x, and g∗b(x) is increasing in x.
Furthermore,
∂g∗b(x)
∂pi(b)
=−b1−pi(a)(a1−a2)
[pi(b)(b1− x)]2 < 0 (A.37)
implies that g∗b(x) decreases as pi(b) increases. However,
∂ 2g∗b(x)
∂pi(b)2 is also negative, which means that
the decrease in g∗b(x) from an increase in pi(b) is more severe for lower values of x.
Since the upper bound of the integration is increasing in pi(b), the expected value of the
salary offered by type b must be increasing with pi(b), since we assign positive weight to higher
salaries not previously included, and the weight attached to those salaries that were previously
included falls more for lower salaries than higher salaries.
The proof for Case 2 uses a similar series of calculations to verify that the expected salary
is increasing in the probability of the firm type. It should also be mentioned that, for some values
of b1 and a1− a2, as pi(a) is increasing, it may cause the equilibrium to switch from Case 1 to
Case 2. In this case, there is some chance that the average equilibrium salary will jump down (or
up), however, for any further increases in pi(a), the result will continue to hold.
Proof of Corollary 2. First, we show that the average equilibrium salary for a given firm type is
non-decreasing in the probability of the other firm type with the same most preferred worker.
Together with Corollary 1, this implies the result. For Case 1, type a’s expected salary does not
depend on pi(b). On the other hand, for type b, both the lower and upper bounds of the support
increase with pi(a). Futhermore, g∗b(x) is decreasing in pi(a), but does so more severely for lower
salaries. Therefore, the expected salary for type b increases with pi(a).
Again, we follow the same steps for proving the result in Case 2, and show that in that case,
the expected salary for type a is actually increasing in pi(b). Also, as discussed in the proof for
Corollary 1, for some values of b1 and a1− a2, an increase in pi(a) may cause the equilibrium to
switch from Case 1 to Case 2. For type b, this means that the expected salary ought to jump down
discretely, lowering the expected salaries of type b for high enough values of pi(a). Nevertheless,
within a particular case, the expected salary for type b is increasing in pi(a).
Proof of Proposition 5. Let pi(a) + pi(b) ≥ 12 and suppose b1 ≥ a1− a2. We conjecture the ex-
istence of a pair of equilibrium distributions (G∗a(·),G∗b(·)), with supports [0,xa] and [xa,xb], re-
spectively. In order to prove that these are in fact equilibrium strategies, we first need to show
indifference between each of the salaries in their corresponding equilibrium supports.
Consider type a firms. For any type a firm f , the expected utility of a salary x f ∈ (0,xa) is
EUa(x f ) = (a1−a2) ·Pr[µ( f ) ∈W1]+a2− x f . (A.38)
The probability Pr[µ( f ) ∈W1] consists of two terms that capture, respectively,
(1) the probability that the actual number of type a firms and type b firms is less than or equal to
n (the number of class W1 workers), plus
(2) the probability that
– the actual number of type a’s and type b’s is greater than n,
– the number of type b’s is less than n, and
– the number of type a firms that choose x > x f is less than or equal to n− the number of
type b’s.
In any other realization of types and salaries, the firm f is matched with a worker w ∈W2 and so
receives a payoff of a2.
If we let j denote the number of type b firms and k denote the number of type a firms out
of the 2n−1 other firms, then we can rewrite the first term of Pr[µ( f ) ∈W1] as
n−1
∑
s=0
(
2n−1
s
)[
pi(a)+pi(b)
]s
·
[
1−pi(a)−pi(b)
]2n−1−s
,
and rewrite the second term of Pr[µ( f ) ∈W1] as
n−1
∑
j=0
2n−1− j
∑
k=n+1− j
[
(2n−1)!pi(b) jpi(a)k[1−pi(a)−pi(b)]2n−1− j−k
j!k!(2n−1− j− k)!
×
n− j−1
∑
t=0
(
k
t
)
G∗a(x f )
k−t [1−G∗a(x f )]t
]
.
At the lowest salary in type a’s support, x f = 0, the expected payoff is equal to
a2+(a1−a2)
[n−1
∑
s=0
(
2n−1
s
)
[pi(a)+pi(b)]s[1−pi(a)−pi(b)]2n−1−s
]
. (A.39)
Since the firm must be indifferent between all of the salaries in the support [0,xa], we can also
solve for the value of xa by equating the expected payoffs from x f = 0 and x f = xa. This implies
that
xa = (a1−a2)
[n−1
∑
j=0
2n−1− j
∑
k=n+1− j
(2n−1)!pi(b) jpi(a)k[1−pi(b)−pi(a)]2n−1− j−k
j!k!(2n−1− j− k)!
]
. (A.40)
Moreover, indifference implies that, for all x f ∈ (0,xa), we have
x f = (a1−a2)
n−1
∑
j=0
2n−1− j
∑
k=n+1− j
[
(2n−1)!pi(b) jpi(a)k[1−pi(a)−pi(b)]2n−1− j−k
j!k!(2n−1− j− k)!
×
n− j−1
∑
t=0
(
k
t
)
G∗a(x f )
k−t [1−G∗a(x)]t
]
. (A.41)
The right-hand side of the equation is a continuous function of G∗a(x f ), which we have assumed
is a continuous function of x f . Since the left-hand side is strictly increasing in x f , it follows that
there exists a continuous function G∗a(x) that satisfies the equation.
Now consider type b firms. For any type b firm f , the expected utility of a salary x f ∈
(xa,xb) is
EUb(x f ) = (b1− x f ) ·Pr[µ( f ) ∈W1]. (A.42)
Since type b firms don’t care about class W2 workers, they are either matched with a class W1
worker, or remain unmatched. In this case, Pr[µ( f ) ∈W1] consists of two different terms,
(1) the probability that there are no more than n−1 other type b firms,
(2) the probability that
– there are more than n−1 other type b firms, but
– the number of type b firms that choose x > x f is less than or equal to n−1.
Again we let j denote the number of type b firms, however now let k denote the number of type b
firms that choose x < x f . Then we can write the first term of Pr[µ( f ) ∈W1] as
n−1
∑
j=0
(
2n−1
j
)
pi(b) j[1−pi(b)]2n−1− j, (A.43)
and the second term as
2n−1
∑
j=n
(
2n−1
j
)
pi(b) j[1−pi(b)]2n−1− j
j
∑
k= j−n+1
(
j
k
)
G∗b(x f )
k[1−G∗b(x f )] j−k. (A.44)
Furthermore, the second term is 0 for x f = xa (the lowest salary in type b’s support), which means
that the equilibrium expected payoff for a type b firm from any x ∈ [xa,xb] must be
(b1− xa)
[n−1
∑
j=0
(
2n−1
j
)
pi(b) j[1−pi(b)]2n−1− j
]
. (A.45)
At the top of type b’s support, the probability that any number of other type b’s choose x < x f =
xb is 1. Thus, the expected payoff from choosing x f = xb is just b1− xb. In order to ensure
indifference, we must have
xb = b1− (b1− xa)
[n−1
∑
j=0
(
2n−1
j
)
pi(b) j[1−pi(b)]2n−1− j
]
. (A.46)
Finally, for all x ∈ (xa,xb), G∗b(x) must satisfy
b1− xb
b1− x =
[n−1
∑
j=0
(
2n−1
j
)
pi(b) j[1−pi(b)]2n−1− j (A.47)
+
2n−1
∑
j=n
(
2n−1
j
)
pi(b) j[1−pi(b)]2n−1− j
j
∑
k= j−n+1
(
j
k
)
G∗b(x f )
k[1−G∗b(x f )] j−k
]
.
